Differences
This shows you the differences between two versions of the page.
| Both sides previous revisionPrevious revisionNext revision | Previous revision | ||
| courses:cs211:winter2018:journals:ahmadh:ch1 [2018/01/17 00:19] – ahmadh | courses:cs211:winter2018:journals:ahmadh:ch1 [2018/01/17 00:21] (current) – ahmadh | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Line 5: | Line 5: | ||
| The problem stems from the question that could one design a college admissions process, or a job recruiting process, that was self-enforcing, | The problem stems from the question that could one design a college admissions process, or a job recruiting process, that was self-enforcing, | ||
| - | This problem can be reduced to a simple problem, the solution to which can be extended to solve the Stable Matching Problem in general: given a set of n men and n women and an order of preference for each man and woman, find a stable matching such that everyone ends up married to somebody and nobody is married to more than one person. | + | This problem can be reduced to a simple problem, the solution to which can be extended to solve the Stable Matching Problem in general: given a set of n men and n women and an order of preference for each man and woman, find a stable matching such that everyone ends up married to somebody and nobody is married to more than one person. This problem is solved--efficiently--by the Gale-Shapley algorithm. |
| ==== Section 1.1.1: Pseudo-code for the Gale-Shapley Algorithm ==== | ==== Section 1.1.1: Pseudo-code for the Gale-Shapley Algorithm ==== | ||
| - | A sketch of the Gale-Shapley algorithm to this problem is given below: | + | A sketch of the Gale-Shapley algorithm |
| Initially all m and w are free | Initially all m and w are free | ||
